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ABSTRACT
LIMIT SETS OF BEST-REPLY PROCESSES
Ako¨z, Kemal Kıvanc¸
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisors: Assist. Prof. Dr. Kevin Hasker
July 2007
I analyze limiting behavior of best-reply processes. I find that without inertia
Nash Equilibria are not limit sets. Moreover, even for processes with inertia,
Nash Equilibria are not stable.
I argue that minimal CURB sets are reasonable candidates for limit sets if
best-reply processes are indeterminate or Nash Equilibria satisfy evolutionary
stability (Oechssler 1997). In such cases, limit sets necessarily contain a Nash
Equilibrium. Otherwise limit sets may not be close to any Nash Equilibria
unless they satisfy some support consistency condition.
Keywords: Best-Reply Processes, Limit Sets, Nash Equilibria, Minimal
CURB sets.
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O¨ZET
EN-I˙YI˙-TEPKI˙ SU¨REC¸LERI˙NI˙N LI˙MI˙T KU¨MELERI˙
Ako¨z, Kemal Kıvanc¸
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Kevin Hasker
Temmuz 2007
En-iyi-tepki su¨rec¸lerinin uzun vadedeki davranıs¸larını inceliyorum. Bu
c¸alıs¸mada atalet olmadan Nash Dengelerinin limit ku¨mesi olus¸turamayacag˘ını
buldum. Ayrıca, ataletli su¨rec¸ler ic¸in bile Nash Dengeleri istikrarlı deg˘iller.
I˙ndirgenemez CURB ku¨meleri en-iyi-tepki su¨rec¸leri belirsiz oldug˘unda ya
da Nash Dengeleri saf stratejilerde evrimsel istikrar kos¸ulunu sag˘ladıg˘ında
limit ku¨meleri ic¸in makul adaylar oluyorlar.Bu durumlarda limit ku¨melerinde
mutlaka bir Nash Dengesi bulunuyor. Dig˘er durumlarda ise, Nash Dengesi
belli bir saf strateji tutarlılıg˘ı kos¸ulunu sag˘lamadıg˘ında limit ku¨meleri hic¸bir
Nash Dengesine yakın olmayabiliyorlar.
Anahtar Kelimeler: En-iyi-tepki su¨rec¸leri, Limit ku¨meleri, Nash Dengeleri,
I˙ndirgenemez CURB ku¨meleri
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Nash Equilibrium is an intellectually compelling model for human behavior
in game theory. Nonetheless it requires both rationality and coordination of
beliefs. We will concentrate on whether rational players learn to coordinate
their beliefs. One way to do this is to define a dynamic best-reply process
among rational players and investigate whether coordination of beliefs is an
outcome of a limit point this best-reply process. In a standard repeated game
a natural model for analysis is rational learning, as was done in Kalai and
Lehrer (1993). In a large matching game where a player will probably not
interact with the same person again the intellectual appeal of this approach
is weaker. In this environment a reasonable alternative is to assume some
type of simple social learning rule and analyze the limiting behavior of the
population.
The common approach in this literature is to analyze the mean of the lim-
iting distribution. For example Hopkins (1999) considers mean dynamics for
best-response processes and compares a perturbed version of best-response
processes with mean dynamics in evolutionary game theory. Although this
approach makes it possible to employ methods of differential equations or
inclusions, it can be misleading. The population distribution may not con-
verge when mean converges and so the mean does not summarize the limiting
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behavior of the population. A limiting distribution in mean dynamics may
correspond to a non-singleton absorbing set in distribution dynamics. More-
over, under any payoff monotone mean dynamics Nash Equilibrium is a fixed
point (Friedman 1991, Ritzberger and Weibull 1995), but the mixed equilibria
may either not be in the limit distribution (called limit sets in this paper) or
form a singleton limit set. Therefore in this paper we partially characterize
the limit sets, or the possible limiting distributions of various distributional
best-reply processes.
Oechssler (1997) is one of the rare studies on learning mixed equilibria
using distributions in best-reply processes. He finds conditions under which
the mixed equilibrium is accessible by a best-reply process in finite time in
games with a unique mixed equilibrium. Under the assumption that no one
changes strategies when they are best replying, Oechssler finds sufficient con-
ditions for the mixed equilibrium to be absorbing in two person symmetric
games. We study two basic best-reply processes—the no-worse and all-best—
in general symmetric games. The all-best process is similar to that analyzed
by Oechssler, under this dynamic all Nash equilibria will be singleton limit
sets. Other limit sets may not include a Nash equilibrium at all. With the
no-worse dynamic the only singleton limit sets will be pure strategy strict
equilibria of the stage game.
We also analyze the relationship between Nash Equilibria and best-reply
learning dynamics. As Oechssler (1997) observes for some cases there are
limit sets that are one mutation away from a mixed equilibrium irrespective
of population size. In such cases, it would be artificial to argue that no
one in the population might make a “mistake” or use some alternative best-
reply process. Thus we allow for finite mutations, a finite number that
is fixed irrespective of population size. If each of these “mutations” occurs
with positive and independent probability then as the population size goes to
infinity this finite number of mutations occurs with a probability approaching
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one, thus a reasonable analysis should include this possibility. This allows
us to analyze the proper closure of our limit sets.
We find that the closure of limit sets provide a deeper understanding
than minimal CURB sets (Basu and Weibull (1991). Not all equilibria are in
minimal CURB sets and the support of minimal CURB sets may not be the
support of any equilibrium. However, some of the Nash Equilibria outside
minimal CURB sets are contained in closure of limit sets. We prove that
consistent Nash Equilibria belong to closure of limit set, where consistency is
defined for best-replies of its support. Moreover if a Nash Equilibrium satisfies
evolutionary stability for pure strategies, ESPS (Oechssler 1997), then there
is a limit set contained in the support of the Nash Equilibrium. However, we
do not have a clear characterization for when an equilibrium will be in closure
of a limit set.
The existence of limit sets outside minimal CURB sets means that for
some initial conditions no minimal CURB set is accessible. This might seem
contradictory to affirmative results for accessibility of minimal CURB sets in
the literature (Kosfeld, Drost, and Voorneveld 2002, Young 2001, Sanchirico
1996). However Kosfeld, Drost, and Voorneveld (2002) define CURB sets
in an unconventional way so that any pure strategy best-reply cycle forms
a CURB set. It is easy toobserve that any learning rule that puts positive
weights to best-replies will access to a minimal CURB set and what they
prove is consistent with this observations. When the CURB set is defined as
in Young (2001) , we might not have same results. One needs some form of
indeterminateness in best-reply processes, that is some positive share of the
population should be allowed to play something else from best-reply to the
current distribution to prove accessibility of minimal CURB sets.
Young (Young2001) and Sanchirico (Sanchirico1996) get positive results
concerning accessibility of minimal CURB sets by introducing indeterminate-
ness to the best-reply process. When we translate the belief update proce-
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dures in both models from sampling in time series to cross section over other
players in the population, we see that both models require a form of noisy
sampling, where large noise is possible with small probabilities. Evidently
noisy sampling is not the only way to induce indeterminateness. For exam-
ple, each period a positive share of the population might adopt a different
learning rule or discover that all individuals are learning too and decide to
make use of it like in the clever agents model developed by Saez-Marti and
Weibull (1999). Clearly all these deviations will look like indeterminateness
to an analyst. Under such dynamics we prove that from any initial point
some minimal CURB set is accessible.
In the next chapter we review the relevant literature in stochastic evolution
and learning. Chapter 3 sets up the basic framework of our model and in
chapter 4 we define and analyze best-reply processes. Succeeding two chapters
capture indeterminate and determinate processes. We investigate stability of
limit sets in chapter 7. In chapter 8 we conclude.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
One can broadly break the learning literature into two classes of learning
dynamics, reduced-form models and models that do not have a reduced-form
formulation. In reduced-form models there is a recursive formulation of be-
haviors and belief update procedures. In contrast, in the other type of models
beliefs are represented as probability measure over all future periods. Corre-
spondingly, behavior rules are responses to such probability measures. One
leading model of this class is Bayesian learning , first formulated by Kalai
and Lehrer (1993). In this model players update their beliefs using Bayes
Rule and are forward-looking. Kalai and Lehrer (1993) consider “absolute
continuity” as a restriction on prior beliefs. This condition requires that if an
event is possible given the realized history, then all players should believe that
this event is possible. Given this condition they show that players learn to
predict the future in the long-run. Their main result that if players optimize
the play converges to a Nash Equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game is
stated as a corollary to this assertion.
Although convergence to Nash Equilibrium is a strong result, this model
has received many critiques due to the necessity of absolute continuity. Fu-
denberg and Levine (1998) point out that since the set of possible future
paths is continuum it is impossible to impose full support property on beliefs.
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Therefore prior beliefs will be consistent with the path that will be realized
but inconsistent with almost all of other possible paths. In this respect, ab-
solute continuity is a weak version of equilibrium beliefs. Kalai and Lehrer
(1993) also show that absolute continuity provides a relation between pre-
diction of play and optimization against learning opponents. Nachbar (1997)
argues that in general this relationship is non-trivial. He proves that when
we require prior beliefs to satisfy some intuitive computability properties, si-
multaneous achievement of prediction and optimization is impossible. Foster
and Young (2001) focus on prediction only and prove that if the stage game is
a perturbed version of matching pennies then no player who employs rational
learning can predict the play at all.
Sanchirico’s (1996) model also does not have a reduced-form formulation,
since there is not an explicitly defined learning procedure. Instead, he assumes
that players’ beliefs satisfy some assumptions which can be justified by various
learning procedures. This paper only has three assumptions. The first is that
there is common knowledge of rationality. The second assumption guarantees
that if the play has stayed in a set long enough then players believe that the
play is in the set. These two assumptions make CURB sets absorbing. The
third assumption requires that it is possible for players to play best-reply
to strategy profiles that are in their memory. Under the second and third
assumptions if the memory is large enough the play converges to a minimal
CURB set.
In reduced-form learning models we do not have to put restrictions on
initial beliefs over infinite paths. Moreover reduced-form models can be a
solution to the computability problem that Nachbar (1997) poses. However,
since a behavioral rule is assumed a-priori, there is no justification of the
behavior rule in these models. A reduced-form model is basically a triple:
initial beliefs over the strategy space of the stage game, a belief update process
and a behavioral rule. The literature on this type of model can be classified
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under two branches, mean dynamics and distributional dynamics.
One leading model of mean dynamics has been borrowed from evolution-
ary biology. Under Replicator Dynamics fitter animals produce more off-
spring. In game theory this corresponds to a dynamic where players switch
to strategies with higher payoffs, or payoff monotonicity. Friedman (1991)
and Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) are two important examples of economic
interpretations of Replicator Dynamics. While Friedman (1991) proves that
Nash Equilibria are absorbing under payoff monotone dynamics, Ritzberger
and Weibull (1995) proves same result for upper semi-continuous behavioral
rules. Borgers and Sarin (1997, 2000) provide a psychological justification for
Replicator Dynamics.
Another leading model of mean dynamices is continuous time best-
response. Hopkins (1999) compares a perturbed best-response with evolu-
tionary models. Berger (2002) adds a role game prior to stage game at each
period. By this way, players first decide their role in the stage game, then
play the game. Thus, it becomes possible to analyze asymmetric interactions
in one population. Benaim and Hirsh (1996) prove that continuous time
best-response models serve as an approximation to fictitious play.
The asymptotical similarity between fictitious play and continuous best-
reply processes is not coincidental, since fictitious play behaves like mean
dynamics asymptotically. Although in fictitious play players play in discrete
time, as beliefs are statistical distributions of strategies over the realized
history the play converges to the mean-dynamics.
Fictitious play is one the most studied models in the theory of learning.
Fudenberg and Levine (1998) presents various versions of fictitious play in
detail. Conditional fictitious play developed by Fudenberg and Levine (1999)
is one of the important versions fictitious play. In this model players are able
to detect patterns in the play.
The other subclass of reduced-form learning models is distribution dy-
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namics. In this type of model the state of the world is the distribution of
strategies over the players in population in the current period and possibly
the past periods. Since it is possible to use Markov Chains to analyze discrete
time reduced-form models, one can find the limiting distributions. However,
for games with multiple equilibria limiting distributions are not unique. Intro-
ducing continual random mutations or experimentation will make the Markov
Chain irreducible and thus imply a unique limiting distribution. This type
of models is classified as Stochastic Evolution models. Kandori, Mailath and
Rob (1993) is one of the seminal papers in the Stochastic Evolution liter-
ature. . They consider uniform matching between two populations. The
learning dynamic is a best-reply process which is perturbed by persistent
mutations. They prove that risk dominant equilibrium survives in the long-
run in 2x2 coordination games. Ellison (2000) generalizes the framework of
Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and prove that 1/2-dominant equilibria
survive in the long-run. Ellison (Ellison1993) addresses the same problem
for local interactions and find same result but that convergence occurs much
faster. Fudenberg and Kreps (1995) focus on extensive form games. Under
the condition that players experiment enough (there is a lower bound for
probability of experimentation), non-Nash Equilibrium profiles are unstable
and Nash Equilibria are weakly stable. As Jordan (1993) points out, mixed
equilibria are hard to justify as a limiting distribution of a learning process.
Thus there are limited studies which consider mixed equilibria. Oechssler
(1997) is one of the rare ones, which characterizes learning mixed-equilibria
in 2x2 and 3x3 games and gives a sufficient condition for general symmetric
two-person games.
Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) adopts an approach similar to Harsanyi
(1973). By assuming uncertain payoffs they purify mixed equilibria and ob-
tain a smooth version of fictitious play. Gorodeisky (2006) proves that unique
mixed equilibrium in many 2x2 games is stable. Stability follows from the
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fact that population distribution is not allowed to make big jumps. Since we
allow big jumps in population distribution, no mixed-equilibria is stable in
our model.
Young (1993) develops a learning model related to fictitious play. He
assumes that players play best-reply to a statistical distribution derived from
past plays. However players have a finite memory length and each period they
draw a sample from the past plays remains in the memory. He proves that
the learning process converges to a convention, which is a repetition of pure
strategy equilibrium for games that there is no pure strategy best-response
cycle. He then switches to a perturbed dynamics, which leads to the concept
of stochastically stable limit sets. Stochastic stability is risk dominance in
2x2 coordination games but this result does not generalize.
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CHAPTER 3
The Model
Let G = 〈I, A, u〉 be a finite symmetric game, where I is the finite set
of players, A is the finite set of strategies, and u : A|I| → Q is the payoff
function.
Suppose there is a single population with cardinality N . At each period
t ∈ {0, 1, ...} players in the population uniformly match in |I|-groups to play
the game G. If N is finite, one can assume N ≡ 0 (mod |I|) to guarantee that
everyone plays the game every period.
Let ∆ = ∆(A) be the set of population distributions over strategies;
that is, ∀µ ∈ ∆ µ = (µ (a))a∈A, such that ∀a ∈ A µ (a) is the share
of the population that plays a. For any subset C of A the set of popu-
lation distributions over C is ∆ (C) = {µ ∈ ∆ : ∀a ∈ A\C µ (a) = 0}. The
support of a distribution µ is Supp (µ) = {a ∈ A : µ (a) > 0} and ∀X ⊆ ∆
Supp (X) = ∪µ∈XSupp (µ). ∀a ∈ A the population distribution that all play-
ers play a is denoted by δa. For any subset C of A let δC = ∪a∈Cδa. Let µ1, µ2
∈ ∆, then the line between µ1 and µ2 is
[µ1, µ2] = {µ′ ∈ ∆ : ∃α ∈ (0, 1) such that µ′ = αµ1 + (1− α)µ2} .
Each player plays a strategy in A against the population distribution, so
each player’s strategy is independent. We assume that each player ignores
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her contribution to the population distribution, essentially N is large enough
that a given player’s impact is negligible. Let u¯ : A × ∆(A) → R be the
expected payoff function for mixed strategies. For any player, expected payoff
of playing a ∈ A against µ ∈ ∆ is
u¯ (a, µ) =
∑
aˆ∈A|I|−1
(
Π
|I|−1
i=1 µ (aˆi)
)
u (a, aˆ).
Then the best reply correspondence is given by
∀µ ∈ ∆ BR (µ) = argmax
a∈A
u¯ (a, µ) ,
and correspondingly the best response region is given by ∀ a ∈ A BR−1 (a) =
{µ ∈ ∆ : a ∈ BR (µ)}. We have two non-degeneracy assumptions regarding
best-reply regions:
Assumption 1 1. ∀a ∈ A |BR (a) | = 1
2. ∀a, ∀C ⊆ A, BR−1 (a) ∩∆(C) = ∅ or
◦
(BR−1 (a) ∩∆(C)) 6= ∅ where
the interior is taken with respect to relative topology defined over ∆(C).}
We will be considering various best-reply learning dynamics of how players
choose their strategies. Each process will imply that given the population
distribution µ = µt there is a certain set of distributions that can occur in
period t+ 1. We will call this set as the successor set of µ.
Definition 1 Let {Xt}t≥0 be a Markov process with state space ∆ and for
any period t, the transition function of Xt is F |Xt−1. The successor set of
µ ∈ ∆ is S (µ), where S : ∆⇒ ∆ maps µ to the set of distributions that can
occur in t+ 1 given Xt = µ; that is,
S (µ) = S (Xt) = Supp (F |Xt=µ) = {µ′ ∈ ∆ : F |Xt=µ (µ′) > 0} .
For any best-reply process if [∀µ ∈ ∆ µ ∈ S (µ)] does not hold, then
we cannot talk about singleton successor sets. However, we expect that
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successors pure strategy strict equilibria are themselves. Thus we assume
this here. Define ∀X ⊆ ∆ S (X) = ∪µ∈XS (µ), S0 (µ) = µ, ∀k ≥ 1
Sk (µ) = S
(
Sk−1 (µ)
)
, and S∞ (µ) =
{
µ¯ ∈ ∆ : ∃k <∞ µ¯ ∈ Sk (µ)}.
We will analyze ergodic sets of the Markov Processes derived by the best-
reply processes, which we call limit sets after proving that they are same.
Definition 2 Let X ⊆ ∆ be non-empty. X is a limit set if ∀µ ∈ X S∞ (µ)
= X.
Note that this definition is different than usual definition of ergodic sets.
The defining properties of ergodic sets are that they are absorbing, one can
easily show that limit sets are minimal absorbing sets.
Definition 3 Let X ⊆ ∆ be non-empty. X is absorbing if S∞ (X) ⊆ X. X
is called a minimal absorbing set if there ’s no X ′ ⊂ X such that X ′ is an
absorbing set.
Notice that:
Remark 1 Let X ⊆ ∆(A) be non-empty. X is absorbing if and only if
S (X) ⊆ X.
Proof Suppose X is absorbing, then S (X) ⊆ S∞ (X) ⊆ X. Suppose
S (X) ⊆ X, then by induction over the degree of successor, S∞ (X) ⊆ X. 
Lemma 1 Let X ⊆ ∆(A) be non-empty. X is a limit set if and only if X
is a minimal absorbing set.
Proof Suppose X is a limit set, then S (X) ⊆ S∞ (X) = X, which implies
that X is absorbing. ∀X ′ ⊆ X S∞ (X ′) = X, which follows directly from the
definition of limit sets, implies that X is minimal.
Suppose X is a minimal absorbing set. Then ∀µ ∈ X S∞ (µ) ⊆ X.
Suppose ∃µ ∈ X such that S∞ (µ) 6= X. However, this is a contradiction
with that X is minimal since S∞ (µ) is absorbing. 
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Before passing to best-reply processes, we need following two important
concepts from Game Theory; minimal CURB sets and Nash Equilibria.
Definition 4 A set A˘ ⊆ A is a CURB set iff ∀µ ∈ ∆
(
A˘
)
BR (µ) ∈ A˘. A˘
is a minimal CURB set if it contains no other CURB set.
Definition 5 µ∗ ∈ ∆ is a Nash Equilibrium iff Supp (µ∗) ⊆ BR (µ∗). µ∗ is
called a strict Nash Equilibrium if µ∗ is a Nash Equilibrium and |BR (µ∗) | =
|Supp (µ∗) | = 1.
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CHAPTER 4
Best-Reply Processes
We have two basic best-reply processes, which are no-worse and all-best pro-
cesses. For the no-worse process, successor set is defined as follows:
∀µ ∈ ∆ Snw (µ) = {µ′ ∈ ∆ : ∀a 6∈ BR (µ) , µ′ (a) ≤ µ (a)} .
For the all-best process we put the additional restriction that best-replies
cannot decrease; that is,
∀µ ∈ ∆ Sab (µ) = {µ¯ ∈ ∆ : ∀a ∈ BR (µ) , µ¯ (a) ≥ µ (a)} ∩ Snw (µ) .
Note that the all-best process can be regarded as no-worse process with
inertia. In the all-best process, the share of any strategy which is a best-reply
should not decrease. Thus when players do not switch strategies when they
are playing a best-reply we will realize all-best process.
These processes are determinate processes, that is, the population moves
to the direction of best replies. We will have an extension to indetermi-
nate processes, in which a (small) portion of the population might move
in some other direction.The following definition characterizes indeterminate
best-reply processes.
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Definition 6 A best-reply process is called as ε−indeterminate with respect
to C (·) if and only if it is defined by the following successor relation
∀µ ∈ ∆ S (µ, ε) = S (B∆(C(µ))ε (µ))
where B
∆(C(µ))
ε (µ) = Bε (µ) ∩∆(C (µ)), and Supp (µ) ⊆ C (µ).
Here Bε (µ) is the usual open ball around µ when N is continuum. If N
is finite, Bε (·) can be defined as
∀µ ∈ ∆ Bε (µ) =
{
µ′ ∈ ∆ :
∑
a∈A
|µ′ (a)− µ (a)| < ε
}
.
The first assertion in the following proposition indicates the importance
of the inertia. The second assertion can be regarded as an existence result
for limit sets as there always exists a CURB set.
Proposition 1 The following hold:
1. Let µ∗ be a Nash Equilibrium. If µ∗is a strict Nash Equilibrium, µ∗
is absorbing both in all-best and no-worse processes. Otherwise, µ∗ is
absorbing in all-best, but not in no-worse.
2. Let C ⊆ A. C is a CURB set then ∆(C) is absorbing and contains a
limit set.
Proof µ∗being a strict Nash Equilibrium implies that BR (µ∗) = µ∗, this
makes {µ∗} absorbing for no-worse processes so for all-best processes. Oth-
erwise Supp (µ∗) ⊆ BR (µ∗) implies that Sab (µ∗) = {µ∗} but Snw (µ∗) =
∆ (BR (µ∗)). For the second assertion; clearly, ∆(C) is absorbing since
BR (∆ (C)) ⊆ ∆(C) so S (∆ (C)) ⊆ ∆(C) . This implies by well-ordering
principle that there exists a minimal absorbing set X in ∆(C). By the lemma
above, X is a limit set. 
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From now on, unless otherwise is stated, we will mean no-worse processes
whenever we refer to a best-reply processes.
The next proposition gives a useful characterization of equivalence be-
tween limit sets and population distributions over a minimal CURB set.
However to prove the proposition, following lemma will be needed.
Lemma 2 Let L ⊆ ∆(A) be a limit set for the no-worse process. Then
δSupp(L) ⊂ L and there exists unique limit set in ∆(Supp (L)).
Proof Since ∀µ ∈ L δBR(µ) ⊂ L. Assuming ∃a ∈ Supp (L) such that δa 6∈ L
implies that /∃µ ∈ L such that a ∈ BR (µ). But this requires that
∀µ′ ∈ L ∩ (∆ (Supp (L) \ {a}))S (µ′) ⊆ L ∩ (∆ (Supp (L) \ {a}))
contradicting with a ∈ Supp (L). The second assertion directly follows from
the first. 
Proposition 2 Let L ⊆ ∆(A) be a limit set for no-worse process. Then L
is convex if and only if there exists a minimal CURB set C ⊆ A such that L
= ∆(C).
Proof Assume L is convex. Then by the lemma 2 L = ∆(Supp (L)). But
this implies ∀µ ∈ ∆(Supp (L)) BR (µ) ⊆ Supp (L) ⇒ Supp (L) is a CURB
set. If Supp (L) is not minimal, ∃ a limit set L′ ⊂
6=
L, which is impossible.
Thus Supp (L) is a minimal CURB set. The converse is true by definition. 
In Proposition 1, we assert that if C is a minimal CURB set, then ∆ (C) is
a good place to look for a limit set. If all limit sets are convex, then population
distributions of minimal CURB sets are the only places to look for a limit set.
In the next chapter, we prove that all limit sets of indeterminate processes
are convex.
16
CHAPTER 5
Indeterminate Processes
Note that both Young (2001) and Sanchirico (1996) proved convergence to
minimal CURB sets. They assume some form of indeterminacy in their mod-
els, which makes limit sets convex. Then by the proposition 2, the limit sets
correspond to minimal CURB sets.
Note that ∀µ ∀ε > 0 S (µ) ⊆ S (µ, ε), thus proposition 2 applies for
indeterminate processes.
We will now consider some examples of indeterminate processes to see the
scope of this definition.
Example 1 Suppose C (µ) = Supp (µ). This process might be implied by
following individual behavior rule. In each period, a given portion of the
population imitates instead of best-replying. Some people in the population
choose a strategy by imitating some individual, and others best-reply to the
current distribution of the population.
It is easy to formulate social learning models by successor correspondences.
This method allows to generalize various learning processes by small varia-
tions on the defining successor correspondence.
Noisy beliefs is common way to assume indeterminacy. Young’s dynamics
(1993) is a best-reply process with noisy beliefs. However, he defined this
noise in beliefs by a sampling process, which allows high noise in beliefs.
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Similarly, Sanchirico’s (1996) assumption of best-reply entropy is also a form
of indeterminacy. Following example illustrates that learning processes in
both models are forms of ε−indeterminate processes.
For all succeeding examples,
∀C ⊆ A β0 (C) = C, βi+1 (C) = BR (C) ∪ βi (C) ,
and
β∞ (C) =
{
a ∈ A : ∃k s.t a ∈ βk (C)} .
Example 2 Suppose C (µ) = β1 (Supp (µ)). The corresponding process
might be implied by a noisy belief process. For noise large enough, a por-
tion of the population have wrong beliefs about the current distribution, thus
it is possible that they play a best-reply to any strategy in the support of the
population. When we put a restriction for each period on number of players
who can switch, this process will be Young’s dynamics (1993). For ε large,
this process will be equivalent to the one in Sanchirico (1996).
Example 3 A learning process with clever individuals is also an element
of indeterminate processes. Saez-Marti and Weibull (1999) studies such a
behavior in bargaining games. Suppose C (µ) = β2 (Supp (µ)). In this case,
a portion of the population understands that people in the population play
best-reply to current distribution. Thus they anticipate the distribution after
everyone played their best reply with a large noise, like in Young (2001), and
play best-reply to that.
Example 4 Suppose C (µ) = A. The process correspond to this case is a
best-reply process with continual mutations. In this case, a portion of the
population choose their strategy randomly from the whole strategy set. This
modification switches a learning process to a stochastic evolution process. We
will not analyze this case, but it is possible to characterize stochastically stable
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limit sets, which might be defined as an extension of stochastically stable states
in Kandori Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993).
As the last example illustrates the class of processes that is defined above
contains stochastic evolutionary processes. However, we will restrict our at-
tention to learning processes so we assume ∀µ ∈ ∆(A) C (µ) ⊆ β∞ (Supp (µ))
throughout the analysis. Following lemma states that there is an interior
point in the limit set.
Lemma 3 ∃µ ∈ L such that Supp (µ) = Supp (L)
Proof If |Supp (L) | = 1, L itself a Nash Equilibrium, and we are done.
Now suppose |Supp (L) | > 1. We will use induction for this proof. Let a ∈
Supp (L) be arbitrary. Then ∃ a1 ∈ Supp (L) such that {a1} = BR (δa), then
by the first non-degeneracy assumption, ∃µ1 ∈ S (δa) such that BR (µ1) =
BR (δa1), µ1 (a) > 0 and µ1 (a1) > 0. Assume the inductive hypothesis:
∃µi ∈ L such that Supp (µi) = {a, a1, . . . , ai}. If {a, a1, . . . , ai} = Supp (L),
we are done. So suppose not. Then since {a, a1, . . . , ai} is not a CURB set,
∃ai+1 ∈ Supp (L) \ {a, a1, . . . , ai} s.t.
◦(
BR−1 (ai+1)
) ∩∆({a, a1, . . . , ai}) 6= ∅
and ∃l <∞ such that
Sl (µi) ∩
(
BR−1 (ai+1)
) ∩∆({a, a1, . . . , ai}) 6= ∅.
By repeated use of the non-degeneracy assumption, ∃ {µi1, . . . , µil−1} such
that
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , l}Supp (µij) = {a, a1, . . . , ai} ,
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1}µj+1 ∈ S (µj) , µil ∈
◦(
BR−1
(
δai+1
))
.
Then ∃µi+1 such that Supp (µi+1) = {a, a1, . . . , ai, ai+1} and BR (µi+1) =
BR
(
δai+1
) ⇒ ∃µn−1 ∈ ◦∆(Supp (L)). 
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From an interior point an indeterminate process can reach any point with
same support as the limit set. Thus the limit set should be convex.
Lemma 4 Let Lε be any limit set of an ε- indeterminate process. Then Lε is
convex.
Proof Let µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(Supp (µ)) be any pair of population distributions such
that Supp (µ) = Supp (Lε) and µ ∈ Lε. Take a finite sequence {µ0, . . . , µT}
for some T such that ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , T} µi ∈ [µ, µ′], µ0 = µ, µT = µ′ and ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , T} d (µi−1, µi) = ε2 . Note that µi ∈ Si (µ0, ε) then µT ∈ ST (µ0, ε) ⊆
S∞ (µ, ε) = Lε. Then as µ′ is arbitrary ∆ (Supp (L)) = Lε. 
Following theorem characterizes limit sets of indeterminate processes.
Theorem 1 Let X ⊆ ∆(A) be a limit set for ε−indeterminate process where
ε > 0. Then there exists a minimal CURB set C ⊆ A s.t X = ∆(C).
Proof This trivially follows from lemma 4 and proposition 2. 
In next chapter, we consider the case where the population distribution
evolves in the direction of best-replies.
20
CHAPTER 6
Determinate Processes
We have argued that minimal CURB sets are natural sets to start the analysis
with. However, minimal CURB sets are not perfect candidates for limit sets
of determinate bets-reply processes. Kalai and Samet (1984) consider Nash
Retracts, which could be regarded as a generalization of limit sets except that
they require Nash Retracts to be convex, effectively they considered only
minimal CURB sets by Proposition 2. However, as the following example
illustrates, there may be limit sets outside minimal CURB sets.
Example 5 Consider the following game:
1\2 a b c d e
a 8 1 2 10 0
b 10 8 1 2 0
c 2 10 8 1 0
d 1 2 10 8 0
e 1 6 1 6 1
.
This game has two limit sets. First one is a minimal CURB set and
consists of {e}. The second one is in ∆({a, b, c, d}). The set of points in
∆({a, b, c, d}) to which e is best response is not contained in the limit set, so
is not accessible from any pure strategy. The triangles are faces of the simplex
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∆({a, b, c, d}). The grey region represents the limit set in ∆({a, b, c, d}). The
small black triangle is the region that e is a best-response.
As the example and proposition 1 suggests there may be more limit sets
than minimal CURB sets in a given game. Since minimal CURB sets are not
places to look for a limit set, we have to find another set-valued solution con-
cept. Kosfeld, Drost, and Voorneveld (2002)’s definition of CURB sets gives
an insight about which sets we should consider. We will define pre-CURB
sets which is basically a slightly stronger pure-strategy best-reply cycle.
Definition 7 Let C be a subset of A. C is called a pre-CURB set if and
only if for any strategy a in C BR
([
δa, δBR(δa)
]) ⊆ C. C is called minimal
pre-CURB set iff there is not proper subset C ′ of C such that C ′ is also a
pre-CURB set.
As the following remark indicates, there is a relationship between pre-
CURB set and limit sets.
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Remark 2 Let L ⊆ ∆ be a limit set. Then Supp (L) is a pre-CURB set.
The proof follows from the absorbing property of limit sets. We can now
find an upper and lower bound for number of limit sets.
Proposition 3 Let PC be the set of minimal pre-CURB sets, C be the set of
minimal CURB sets, and L be the set of limit sets. Then |PC| ≥ |L| ≥ |C|.
The proof of the proposition follows directly from remark 2 and proposi-
tion 1.
To apply some of the results below one has to be able to find the limit sets
of a given game. Limit sets are minimal absorbing sets, but that does not help
much. By using the lemma above one can eliminate pure strategies that are
not elements of any minimal pre-CURB sets. Then one calculates S∞ (δa) for
any pure strategy a in any minimal pre-CURB set C. The following algorithm
will be helpful in finding limit sets.
Algorithm 1 Start with µ0 = δa for any a ∈ C where C is a minimal
pre-CURB set. We will calculate a branching path strating from µ0, so ∀i ∈
{1, 2, . . .} µi is a set of points in R|A|. Now ∀b ∈ BR (µ0), ∀c ∈ A\ {b} such
that BR−1 (c) ∩ S (µ0) 6= ∅. Let µ0bc ∈ R|A| be defined as
µ0bc (c) := min µ (c)
µ∈BR−1(c)∩S(µ0)
and ∀d ∈ A\ {c} µ0bc (d) := max µ (d)
µ∈BR−1(c)∩S(µ0)
.
Notice that µ0bc may not belong to ∆. Define
S
(
µ0bc
)
:=
{
µ ∈ ∆ : ∀d ∈ A\ {b} µ (d) ≤ µ0bc (d)
}
.
Then (
BR−1 (c) ∩ S (µ0)) ⊂ S (BR−1 (c) ∩ S (µ0)) ⊆ S (µ0bc) .
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And define
µ1 :=
 µ
0
bc ∈ R|A| : ∀b ∈ BR (µ0) and ∀c ∈ A\ {b}
such that BR−1 (c) ∩ S (µ0) 6= ∅
 .
∀i ∈ {2, 3, . . .} calculate µibc as in µ1bc, however define µi as follows
µ1 :=
 µ
0
bc ∈ R|A| : ∀b ∈ A such that BR−1 (a) ∩ S (µi−1) ∩ S (µi−2) 6= ∅
and ∀c ∈ A\ {b} such that BR−1 (c) ∩ S (µ0) 6= ∅
 .
Note that this algorithm is sufficient but not necessary as ∀i S (µibc) might
be larger than S (BR−1 (c) ∩ S (µi−1)). To make algorithm necessary one has
to calculate (S (µibc) ∩ S (µi−1)) \ (BR−1 (c) ∩ S (µi−1)). If this set is empty
there is no problem; if not, excluding successor of this set will do the job.
Both pre-CURB sets and CURB sets are set valued solution concepts. We
have found relationships betweenlimit sets with these solution concepts. One
natural question at this point that what is the relation between limit sets and
singleton solution concepts. The first natural candidate is Nash Equilibria.
We will prove that some Nash Equilibria are “close” to a limit set. Before
stating and proving this result we need to formalize the concept of closeness
in best-reply processes.
By the closure of a limit set we mean the set of distributions that can be
reached from the limit set with “zero cost”; that is, the set of points such that
the minimum prabability that is needed for reaching to any point in this set
with mutations is zero. We will call this set limit set with finite mutations.
If N is infinite, this set corresponds to the usual closure of the limit set.
If N is finite, we will define a discrete probability distribution on the pos-
sible number of individuals who may mutate. We will keep the maximum
number limited such that even in the extreme case that all possible muta-
tions occur, only a small part of the population will mutate. The probability
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distribution is
η : {0, 1, . . . ,m} −→ [0, 1] s.t ∑mi=0 η (i) = 1 and η (i) > 0
∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} where m > 0 is fixed for all population sizes N . Then the
successors with mutations of any µ is:
S˜ (µ,N) = S
(
Bm
N
(µ)
)
.1
Then given any limit set L a m-transitional limit set is defined as:
L˜N =
⋃
µ∈L
S˜ (µ,N)
and a finite transitional limit set is defined as:
L+∞ = lim
N→∞
L˜N
any point in L+∞∩∆N can always be reached with a finite number of mutations
as N →∞, and this set is unique. Thus our transitional limit set is
L¯ = L+∞ ∩∆N .
Note that analyzing the closure L¯ of a limit set is equivalent to analyzing
transitional limit set, since each point in the boundary of the limit set is one
mutation away from the limit set. Let µ∗ be Nash Equilibrium whose support
is contained in the support of limit set. We will show that if best-reply of
any element in the support of µ∗ is an element of the set of best-replies of µ∗,
then µ∗ belongs to the closure of the limit set.
Theorem 2 Let µ∗ be a Nash Equilibrium such that Supp (µ∗) ⊆ Supp (L).
Then if ∀a ∈ Supp (µ∗) BR (δa) ∈ BR (µ∗) then µ∗ ∈ L¯.
Before proving the theorem, we will need following two lemmas.
1this is not the exact definition, but for large N the difference will not affect any result.
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Lemma 5 ∀a ∈ Supp (L), ∀µ1,µ2 ∈ [δa, µ∗]
d (µ2, µ
∗) < d (µ1, µ∗)⇒ inf
µ∈S(µ2)∩[δb,µ∗]
d (µ, µ∗) < inf
µ∈S(µ1)∩[δb,µ∗]
d (µ, µ∗)
where d (·, ·) is the usual metric defined over R|A|.
Proof ∀a ∈ Supp (L), ∀µ1, µ2 ∈ [δa, µ∗] we will first show that
d (µ2, µ
∗) < d (µ1, µ∗)⇔ µ2 (a) < µ1 (a) .
For each i = 1, 2 ∃λi ∈ [0, 1] µi = λiδa + (1− λi)µ∗. Thus d (µ2, µ∗) <
d (µ1, µ
∗) ⇒
λ2 < λ1 ⇒ µ2 (a) = λ2 + (1− λ2)µ∗ (a) < λ1 + (1− λ1)µ∗ (a) = µ1 (a) .
Following the steps in reverse order proves the converse.
Let µ¯1, µ¯2 ∈ [δb, µ∗] be such that d (µ¯i, µ∗) = infµ∈S(µi)∩[δb,µ∗] d (µ, µ∗). Note
that ∀i ∈ {1, 2} µ¯i exists and unique since both and S (µi) and [δb, µ∗] are
compact and [δb, µ
∗] is a line. Then
µ¯i (b) = inf
µ∈S(µi)∩[δb,µ∗]
µ (b) .
This requires that we will choose µ¯i such that µ¯i (b) is minimum in S (µi) ∩
[δb, µ
∗]. Since BR (µ1) = BR (µ2) = b, share of b must increase while passing
from µi to µ¯i. So we will keep this increase at minimum.
Let µ′i ∈ [δb, µ∗] be such that
∀c ∈ A\ {a, b} µ′i (c) = µi (c) , µ′i (a) = µi (b) andµ′i (b) = µi (a) .
Note that µ′i is uniquely defined for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Since ∀µ ∈ [δb, µ∗] ∀c, c′
∈ Supp (L) \ {b} µ (c) = µ (c′), ∀µ ∈ [δb, µ∗] such that d (µ, µ∗) < d
(
µ′i , µ∗
)
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⇒ µ (b) < µ′i (b) ⇒
∀c ∈ Supp (L) \ {b} µ (c) > µ′i (c) .
Then µ′i = µ¯i. But then µ2 (a) < µ1 (a) ⇒ µ¯2 (b) < µ1 (b) ⇒ d (µ¯2, µ∗) <
d (µ¯1, µ
∗). 
Before proceeding to the next lemma, we have to define the following;
given Supp (µ∗) ⊆ Supp (L) ∀a ∈ Supp (L), let µ¯a ∈ [δa, µ∗] be such that
d (µ¯a, µ
∗) = infµ∈L∩[δa,µ∗] d (µ, µ
∗). The next lemma states that there is no
such a maximal point in the limit set that is not equal to µ∗.
Lemma 6 Either for any a ∈ Supp (L) BR (δa) ∈ BR (µ¯a) or for any a ∈
Supp (L) µ¯a 6= µ∗.
Proof Assume
[[∀a ∈ Supp (L) BR (δa) ∈ BR (µ¯a)] ∧ [∀a ∈ Supp (L) µ¯a 6= µ∗]] ,
and let a ∈ Supp (L) be arbitrary. For µ¯a ∃λ ∈ [0, 1] such that ∀b ∈
Supp (L) \ {a} µ¯a (b) = λµ∗ (b). Then let µλb ∈ [δb, µ∗] be such that ∀c ∈
Supp (L) \ {b} µλb (c) = λµ∗ (c). Now we will consider
Co
{
µλb : b ∈ Supp (L)
}
as our new simplex. Note that µ∗ ∈ Co{µλb : b ∈ Supp (L)} and
∀µ ∈ ∂ (∆ (Supp (L)))∃µλ ∈ ∂ (Co{µλb : b ∈ Supp (L)})
such that µλ = λµ∗ + (1− λ)µ. If BR (µλ) ∩ Supp (L) = ∅ for some µλ
∈ S∞ (µ¯a) ∃µˆ ∈ L close enough to µ¯a such that ∃µˆλ ∈ S∞ (µˆ) such that
BR
(
µˆλ
) ∩ Supp (L) = ∅ by lemma 5, which is a contradiction. Moreover
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let µ ∈ ∂ (∆ (Supp (L))) such that |BR (µ) | = 1, then |BR (µλ) | = 1. Since
otherwise
∃{µλi }i≥1 ⊂ Co{µλb : b ∈ Supp (L)}
such that BR
(
µλi
) 6= BR (µλ) and µλi → µλ as i → ∞. But by convex-
ity of best-reply regions and by hypothesis µ∗, ∃ {µi}i≥1 ⊂ ∂ (∆ (Supp (L)))
such that BR (µi) 6= BR (µ) and µi → µ as i → ∞, which is impossible by
2nd non-degeneracy assumption. Then we can extend the proof in lemma
3 to Co
{
µλb : b ∈ Supp (L)
}
. Then ∃µ ∈ Co{µλb : b ∈ Supp (L)} such that
∀b ∈ Supp (L) µ (µλb ) > 0 . But by again repeated use of the second non-
degeneracy assumption ∃ε > 0 such that
(Bε (µ¯a) ∩∆(Supp (L))) ⊆ S (µ′)
for some µ′ ∈ Co{µλb : b ∈ Supp (L)} ⇒
∃µ¯′a ∈ [δa, µ∗] ∩ L such that d (µ¯′a, µ∗) < d (µ¯a, µ∗) ,
which is a contradiction with the definition of µ¯a. 
With these two lemmas, the proof of the Theorem is immediate.
Proof [Proof of Theorem] Supp (µ∗) = Supp (L) ⇒ u (δa, µ∗) =
u (δb, µ
∗) ∀a, b ∈ Supp (L). Now since
[[∀a ∈ Supp (L) BR (δa) ⊆ BR (µ¯a)] ∧ [∀a ∈ Supp (L) µ¯a 6= µ∗]]
leads to a contradiction, either ∃a ∈ Supp (L) such that µ¯a = µ∗, in which
case we are done, or ∃a ∈ Supp (L) such that BR (µ¯a) ∩ Supp (L) = ∅, which
is a contradiction since in that case ∃µ ∈ L close enough to µ¯a such that
BR (µ) ∩ Supp (L) = ∅ by lemma 5. Thus if µ∗ is not a Nash Equilibrium,
then we will have a contradiction by second lemma above. Moreover, µ∗ is a
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Nash Equilibrium ⇒ [∀a ∈ Supp (L) µ¯a 6= µ∗] is wrong so µ∗ ∈ L¯. 
The condition in the theorem is sufficient; however, as the following ex-
ample shows this condition is not necessary:
Example 6 Consider the following game:
1\2 a b c
a 5 10 10
b 10 5 5
c 11 3 3
The only Nash Equilibrium in this game
(
1
2
, 1
2
, 0
)
lies in the interior of the
limit set.
Although the requirement in the theorem is not necessery, it is critical.
When we relax the condition we can find limit sets such that there is no Nash
Equilibrium near the limit set. Following is an example to this observation.
Example 7 Consider the following game:
1\2 a b c d
a 9 10 3 1
b 3 9 10 9
c 8 5 9 10
d 10 1 1 9
.
In this game the unique limit set lies in the set of distributions over the unique
minimal CURB set {a, b, c, d}. Here there are three Nash Equilibria, which
are
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0
)
, (0.858, 0, 0.142, 0),
(
64
174
, 8
25
, 0, 11
35
)
, and none of them belongs
to the closure of the limit set. At this stage one can ask whether there exists
a Nash Equilibrium in ∆(Supp (L)) necessarily for any limit set L. Answer
to that question will be negative. A modification of the example above will
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provide a counter-example to this assertion:
1\2 a b c d e1 e2 e3
a 9 10 3 1 0 0 0
b 3 9 10 9 0 0 0
c 8 5 9 10 0 0 0
d 10 1 1 9 0 0 0
e1 7 7 7 0 0 0 0
e2 7 7 0 7 0 0 0
e3 7 + ε 0 7 + ε 0 1 1 1
where ε > 0. In this game there are two limit sets one in ∆({a, b, c, d}) and
the other is {e3}. However, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium e3. Thus
there is no Nash Equilibrium in ∆({a, b, c, d}).
The theorem 2 provides a sufficient condition for a Nash Equilibrium to be
included in closure of a limit set. Oechssler (1997) gives a sufficient condition
which he calls evolutionary stability for pure strategies (ESPS) for a Nash
Equilibrium to be in the limit set. However he defines ESPS for the unique,
full support Nash Equilibrium. Thus ESPS is not a natural restriction for the
general case we analyze. We will modify that condition in the next definition.
Before that we have to define the most overrepresented strategies. let C be
a nonempty subset of A. For any µ, µ∗ ∈ ∆(C) O (µ, µ∗) represents the set
of strategies that are the most overrepresented ones with respect to µ∗at µ;
that is,
∀µ ∈ ∆ O (µ, µ∗) = {a ∈ A : µ (a)− µ∗ (a) ≥ µ (b)− µ∗ (b) ∀b ∈ A} .
Definition 8 µ∗ satisfies evolutionary stability for pure strategies (ESPS) if
for any µ ∈ ∆(Supp (µ∗)) \ {µ∗} there exists a ∈ O (µ, µ∗) and b ∈ Supp (µ∗) \
O (µ, µ∗) such that a /∈ BR (µ) and b ∈ BR (µ).
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Note that this means that µ∗ does not have any Nash Equilibrium that
have support on subset of µ∗.
Let µ∗ be a Nash Equilibrium that satisfies ESPS, then it does not
necessarily follow that there is a limit set in ∆ (Supp (µ∗)). The follow-
ing proposition gives a characterization regarding existence of a limit set in
∆ (Supp (µ∗)). The proof follows from a modification of the proof in Oechssler
(1997).
Proposition 4 Let µ∗ be a Nash Equilibrium that satisfies ESPS. Then the
set of population distributions over Supp (µ∗) is a limit set if and only if
Supp (µ∗) is a minimal CURB set.
Proof Suppose ∃ a limit set L = ∆(Supp (µ∗)). If there exists µ ∈
∆(Supp (µ∗)) such that BR (µ) 6⊆ Supp (µ∗) then L = ∆(Supp (µ∗)) would
be wrong.
Suppose Supp (µ∗) is a minimal CURB set. Then there is a limit set such
that
L ⊆ ∆(Supp (µ∗)) .
Let a1 ∈ Supp (L) be arbitrary and µ0 := δa1 . If δa1 = L, we are
done.Otherwise O (µ0, µ∗) = {a1}. Then ∃a2 ∈ Supp (L) such that a2 =
BR (µ0). If {a1, a2} = Supp (L), we are done. Otherwise let µ1 be such that
µ1 (a1) = µ
∗ (a1) andµ1 (a2) = 1− µ∗ (a2)⇒ O
(
µ1, µ∗
)
= {a2} .
So we have two cases. In the first case, a1 ∈ BR (µ1) ⇒ ∃µ¯1 ∈ [δa1 , µ1] such
that O (µ¯1, µ∗) = {a1, a2} or {a1, a2} ⊆ BR (µ¯1) ⇒ µ¯1 = µ∗ in which case we
are done. Thus suppose O (µ¯1, µ∗) = {a1, a2} ⇒ ∃a3 ∈ Supp (L) \ {a1, a2}
such that a3 ∈ BR (µ¯1), then proceed. In the second case a1 /∈ BR (µ1) then
proceed.
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Let µ2 = (µ∗ (a1) , µ∗ (a2) , 1 − µ∗ (a1) − µ∗ (a2) , 0, . . . , 0). If
{a1, a2, a3} = Supp (µ∗) then we are done. Otherwise
O
(
µ2, µ∗
)
= {a3} ⇒ a3 6∈ BR
(
µ2
)
.
If {a1, a2} ⊂ BR (µ2) ⇒ ∃µ¯2 such that
µ¯2 (ai)− µ∗ (ai) = µ¯2 (aj)− µ∗ (aj) ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
⇒ ∃ a4 ∈ Supp (L) \ {a1, a2, a3} such that a4 ∈ BR (µ¯2) then proceed.
If {a1, a2} 6⊆ BR (µ2), and if a1,a2 /∈ BR (µ2) then proceed. Otherwise
WLOG assume that a1 ∈ BR (µ2) but a2 6∈ BR (µ2). Then
∃µˆ2 ∈ S (µ2) such that O (µˆ2, µ∗) = {a1, a2} .
If a1,a3 /∈ BR (µˆ2) then proceed. Otherwise WLOG assume that a1 ∈ BR (µˆ2)
but a3 6∈ BR (µˆ2). We have two cases here. In the first case a2 ∈ BR (µˆ2) ⇒
µ¯2 ∈ S (µˆ2) then proceed. In the second case
a2 /∈ BR
(
µˆ2
)⇒ ∃a4 ∈ Supp (L) \ {a1, a2, a3}
such that a4 ∈ BR (µ¯2) then proceed. Continuing in this fashion we get µ∗ ∈
L. But this implies that L = ∆(Supp (µ∗)). 
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CHAPTER 7
Stability
We have proved that in remark that limit sets are minimal absorbing sets.
This result can be interpreted as that limit sets are stable in the sense that
once the population enters a limit set then it does not leave the set. However,
as in the notion of “perfectness” in game theory, a common understanding of
stability in economic theory is such that stability is a stronger condition than
being absorbing. We will call a limit set stable if and only if “small” deviations
from the limit set does not lead to large deviations in the long-run. But before
giving the rigorious definition of stability, we have to formalize what “small”
is.
If N is continuum, small deviations from limit set L is just for small ε > 0
Bε (L) := ∪µ∈LBε (µ). If N is finite, we will be playing with population size
N , since for small populations no deviation is small. Then ∀ (ε,N) ∈ R× N
such that ε > 1
N
Bε (L) :=
{
µ ∈ ∆ : ∃µ′ ∈ L such that
∑
a∈A
|µ (a)− µ′ (a) | < ε
}
.
Now we can define stability as follows:
Definition 9 Let L be a limit set. Then L is stable if and only if limε→0
S∞ (Bε (L)) = S∞
(
L¯
)
where L¯ is closure of the limit set L.
33
In the proposition 1, we claimed that inertia matters in terms of limit sets.
However, for stable limit sets inertia does not induce any difference; stable
all-best limit sets are also stable no-worse limit sets.
Lemma 7 No non-strict Nash Equilibrium constitutes a stable all-best limit
set.
Proof of this lemma follows directly from definition of a non-strict Nash
Equilibrium. This lemma proves following proposition
Proposition 5 Assume that Lab ⊆ Lnw then Lab is stable if and only if Lnw
is stable.
This proposition is a necessary condition for limit set for being stable.
Following proposition gives a useful sufficient condition for a no-worse limit
set to be stable.
Proposition 6 If L is a non-singleton convex limit set, then L is stable.
Proof By proposition 2 ∃ a minimal CURB set C such that L = ∆(C).
But then ∃ε > 0 such that ∀ε′ ∈ (0, ε) BR (Bε′ (∆ (C))) ⊆ C. Then
S (Bε′ (∆ (C))) ⊆ Bε′ (∆ (C)), which proves the result after applying induc-
tion over degrees of the successor correspondence. 
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
We have analyzed limit sets of no-worse and all-best processes. We have found
that limit sets of these two processes differ. Then for no-worse processes,
we showed that minimal CURB sets are not perfect candidates of limit
sets for determinate processes. However, indeterminateness and ESPS may
justify minimal CURB sets as limit sets under some circumstances. Moreover,
we proves that full support Nash Equilibria are close to limit sets, but a
characterization of this relation remains to be an interesting open problem.
As we note in the chapter 5, one can define and study stochastically stable
limit sets within this framework. Such a study will be a generalization of
Kandori Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). However, we conjecture
that this generalization will be costly in the sense that many results in those
studies will not hold. Such a study will be a considerable contribution to the
literature of learning in games.
As an application of this paper, one can study dynamic general equilibrium
models in the theory of economic growth. This framework can be regarded as
an alternative approach to representative-agent framework for such models.
One can ask under which conditions limit sets coincide competitive equilibria.
Moreoever, it would be interesting to know that when they do not concide,
whether cylic behavior in non-singleton limit sets could explain business cycles
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as deterministic movements.
We have considered best-reply processes in this paper. As Josephson et
al. showed that different behavior types lead to different minimal closed sets.
However, limit sets of processes that are generated from a behavior type might
not coincide with the corresponding minimal closed sets. Understanding when
these two sets coincide for different learning processes is crucial for forming
a general theory of distributional learning dynamics. However, there is so
much to do compared to things that have been done in this literature, as
many fields in game theory.
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